2 the soft budget constraint. Based on the tradeoff between political benefits and (endogenous) economic costs, it analyzes how the government's incentive to soften budget constraints depends on the extent of decentralization of fiscal and/or monetary authority. Although our study is motivated by the recent Chinese experience where devolution of authority from the central to local governments is a major feature of reform, the theme of the paper is more general. Indeed, in the U.S. and Europe, and in many developing and transition economies, there is a growing interest in studying the relationship between federalism and government incentives.
We build a model of the soft budget constraint in a three-tier hierarchy with a "central government"
at the top, multiple "local governments" in the middle, and "enterprises" (state and non-state) at the bottom.
The model has the following features. First, the soft budget constraint game between government bodies and enterprises is sequential: government bodies face sequential bailout decisions in the presence of sunk costs and enterprises behave strategically in securing subsidies. Second, the local governments compete with each other in allocating their own budgets to attract mobile factors and grants from the central government in a simultaneous-move game. And third, the central government plays a sequential game against local governments in deciding on the allocation of grants and, if monetary financing is possible, on total money supply. The study of incentive problems in a three-tier hierarchy is generally complicated and difficult, and this difficulty is only reinforced by the introduction of fiscal competition and factor mobility. Nevertheless, we are able to derive several results on the effect of federalism in hardening budget constraints.
We first show that decentralization of fiscal authority to local governments together with mobility of non-state capital across regions may be effective in hardening the budget constraints of enterprises under local governments' control. This is because competition among local governments in attracting capital to their region creates an externality which increases the opportunity cost of subsidizing inefficient enterprises, which in turn reduces the incentives for bailouts. Fiscal competition can thus be viewed as a commitment device (the "competition effect"). However, this comes at the cost of distortions such as excessive infrastructure investment.
When fiscal decentralization is not complete and the central government has the power to allocate part of the fiscal revenues, local governments will also compete for grants. Interestingly, if the central 3 government earmarks grants for local public goods and subsidies, strategic distortions by local governments further increase the opportunity cost of bailout, thus achieving harder budget constraints, provided the grant size is not too large.
We then consider the possibility of monetary financing with the central government creating money and allocating seigniorage revenue while local governments continue to have full authority over their expenditures. Fiscal competition together with competition for monetary grants works in a similar way towards hardening the budget constraint of enterprises. However, inflation will be higher than under fiscal centralization if the central government allocates earmarked grants hoping to "correct" distortionary decisions by local governments. But if the central government has no discretionary powers in the allocation of seigniorage revenue between local governments, inflation will be lower than under fiscal centralization. The reason is that the difference in spending preferences between the central and local governments due to fiscal competition induces endogenously a conflict of interests, which may achieve both harder budget constraints and monetary restraint (the "checks and balance effect").
In the extreme case of monetary decentralization, with the externality of inflation, each local government receives the full benefits from its monetary creation but shares the costs of inflation with other regions. This creates high inflation and generally softens budget constraints.
Our analysis can be used to interpret the unique features of China's transition process to markets. In Eastern Europe and Russia, privatization is the main focus of transition. In contrast, China's transition was first and foremost associated with the devolution of government authority from the central to local level.
Recently, local governments in China took the initiative to lay off excess workers and even privatize the enterprises under their supervision. This happened at a time when monetary authority was recentralized and inflation was lowered. According to our analysis, decentralization together with competition has a profound impact on the incentives of local governments. It induces harder budget constraints because it increases the local governments' costs of subsidies, and furthermore, this effect requires the support of monetary centralization. From this perspective, reform of government organization, such as fiscal decentralization, is an important dimension of the transition from a plan to a market economy.
Our paper presents the first macroeconomic model of the soft budget constraint viewed as a dynamic 4 commitment problem in the framework of a federal government. Even though our concept of the soft budget 2 constraint is the same as that of Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) , there are a number of important distinctions between our model and theirs. First, in their model, firms are bailed out by profit-maximizing banks, and in ours by a government which also cares about employment rents. Second, our model endogenizes sources of 3 revenue for bailouts. This allows us to endogenize the opportunity cost of bailouts which depends on the organization of government. Finally, crucial conditions leading to hard budget constraints in their model are the limited liquidity of the bank and the costly information transfer between banks. In our model, the size of the budget matters less than its allocation among various expenditures. In fact, government budgets are larger when budget constraints are hard since a higher efficiency yields more tax revenues. This paper contributes to the literature on local public finance and fiscal federalism (e.g., Charles Tiebout, 1956 , Wallace Oates, 1972 , Roger Gordon, 1983 , and David Wildasin, 1988 by analyzing the link between fiscal competition and government incentives for bailouts. Thus, it adds to the growing literature on incentive problems in the context of the organization of government. For example, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort (1994) investigate the role of duplication of regulators in preventing collusion, and Torsten Persson, Gérard Roland, and Guido Tabellini (1997) study the role of separation of powers in the organization of government in improving the accountability of government. Our results are also in accordance with recent historical analysis (e.g., Barry Weingast, 1995) and studies on transition economies (e.g., Yingyi Qian and Barry Weingast, 1996; 1997) emphasizing the commitment effects of federalism.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I presents a three-tier hierarchy model involving the soft budget constraint in a macroeconomic context. Section II demonstrates the role of fiscal competition among local governments as a commitment device to harden the budget constraints of enterprises. Section III introduces monetary creation as an additional source of financing and analyzes the implications of alternative monetary arrangements under fiscal decentralization on the budget constraints and inflation. Section IV uses our theory to interpret the reform experience of China. Section V concludes with some general implications of our analysis.
I. The Model
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We consider an economy with N identical regions. In each region, there are state enterprises and new non-state enterprises. The economy can be viewed as a three-tier hierarchy composed of a central government at the top, N local governments in the middle, and enterprises at the bottom. Although the setup of the model is tailored to the situation of the Chinese economy, the logic of the model can be applied to other federal states. The model has three dates. 4 
State Enterprises
At date 0, there are n (n is large) state enterprises, each having one project in place. The return on a project has two components: a verifiable (taxable) return R and a non-verifiable (non-taxable) private benefit i B (net of effort) accruing to employees (workers and managers). A type 1 project, present in proportion ", proportion (1 -"), yields (R , B ) at date 1 only if the enterprise chooses action (effort) e , which can beh interpreted as "restructuring" or "privatization." If, however, action (effort) e is chosen, which means l maintaining the "status quo," then the project yields (0, 0) at date 1. In the latter case, the government and the enterprise can engage in efficient renegotiation: if 1 unit of funds is injected (i.e., bailout), a type 2 project will yield (R , B ) at date 2. For the sake of simplicity, we assume no discounting and R = 0. We assume 
Non-State Enterprises
Non-state enterprises emerge at date 1 and their activities in region i are described by a production function f(K , I ), where K represents non-state capital and I represents public infrastructure investment
which is financed from the government budget at date 1. We make standard assumptions f (K , I ) > 0, f (K , I ) > 0, f (K , I ) < 0, f (K , I ) < 0, and f (K , I ) > 0.
Thus, public infrastructure investment raises the marginal productivity of non-state capital. For analytical simplicity, we assume that the total amount of non-state capital is fixed (E K = K) and non-state capital is i perfectly mobile across regions. All we really need for our qualitative conclusions, however, is the assumption that non-state capital is less mobile across countries than across regions within a country.
We offer two interpretations of non-state capital. The first interpretation is domestic non-state or private capital. With this interpretation, the assumption of inelastic supply of non-state capital is realistic because formally domestic capital in China is not allowed to leave the country (even though some capital flight is inevitable in practice). On the other hand, despite the fact that allocation of state capital remains under state control, domestic non-state capital in China has a considerable degree of mobility across provinces.
The second interpretation is foreign capital. In such a case, the assumption that foreign capital is less mobile across countries than across regions within a country can be justified on empirical grounds in general and in particular for the case of China. Following the influential paper by Martin Feldstein and Charles Horioka (1980) , extensive evidence has accumulated indicating substantial capital immobility across countries in general (e.g., Roger Gordon and Lans Bovenberg, 1996) . This includes a high correlation between domestic savings and investment; real interest differentials across countries; and a lack of international portfolio diversification. In contrast, capital mobility within countries is high. For example, Tamim Bayoumi and Andrew Rose (1993) found strong evidence of capital mobility across regions in the U.K. using the Feldstein-Horioka methodology.
But international capital mobility to China is particularly imperfect for idiosyncratic reasons. Unlike most OECD and newly industrializing countries, China has maintained formal control over its capital account. Officially, capital is not free to flow into or out of China: Capital inflow to China is controlled as well as repatriation of profits. In fact, it was not until December 1996 that the Chinese government announced the current account convertibility of its currency, but it has no plans to make capital accounts convertible in the near future. These imperfections in international capital mobility need to be contrasted 5 with much more perfect foreign capital mobility within China. Once a foreign firm manages to invest in China, it can freely choose its location. The only consideration is profitability. Moreover, international 7 investors must incur some costs before investing in China to overcome language barriers and acquire knowledge of Chinese laws, etc. Once these costs are sunk, it is much less costly to move capital from, say, Guangdong to Shanghai.
The Government's Budget
We consider the government budget at date 1. In each region, on the revenue side, T -J is the net i i tax revenue exclusively from state enterprises, where T is total taxes and J is transfers to state employees.
i i
On the expenditure side, the budget is used for three purposes: subsidies (or bailout) S for type 2 projects; i public infrastructure investment I and local public goods provision z :
Actual tax revenues and expenditures will depend on whether the budget constraints of enterprises are hard (action e and no bailout of type 2 projects) or soft (action e and bailout of type 2 projects). We can h l rewrite the government budget as:
where E = E = nR or E = E = "nR -(1-")n (E > E ), depending on whether budget constraints are hard or
We assume no tax on returns to non-state capital. This can be justified by the difficulty of such taxation in practice. It is difficult to tax domestic non-state capital in transition economies due to the lack of good tax institutions. Indeed, the great majority of taxes in China were collected from the state sector. It is also well known that foreign firms are able to evade income taxes in host countries by transfer pricing schemes. This is true in developed countries and more so in developing countries like China. However, in Appendix A we show that our analysis goes through and our results continue to hold even with taxation of returns to non-state capital. 
where x is assumed to be an increasing and concave function of I . The total private benefits of the because the government is not concerned with returns to foreign capital. The two specifications will give qualitatively similar results; for concreteness we will use the interpretation of foreign capital.
Equilibrium
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We define the game played under federal institutions as follows:
The interaction between governments and state enterprises. In this sequential interaction an equilibrium is defined by: a) a choice of action e of state enterprises at date 0 to maximize private benefits given the expected choice of J , S , I and z by the government; and b) the government's choice of J , S , I and
z at date 1 in order to maximize social welfare, given the choice of action by state enterprises. We define soft i budget constraint equilibria as subgame perfect equilibria in which enterprises with type 2 projects choose e l and the government chooses bailout, and hard budget constraint equilibria as equilibria in which enterprises with type 2 projects choose e and the government chooses no bailout.
h
The interaction among local governments. Except for the case of complete centralization, there is a competition between local governments at date 1 to attract foreign capital and grants from the central government. Local governments move simultaneously where strategies are choices of budget allocation. The equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium in which each local government takes the budget allocation of other local governments as given.
The interaction between the central and local governments. The interaction between the central
and local governments at date 1 concerns allocation of grants and monetary creation (except for the cases of complete centralization and complete decentralization). This is a sequential interaction between the central government and local governments. We will consider the case in which the central government makes decisions (such as allocating grants and creating money) after the local governments' decisions, which reflects the fact that the central government often accommodates the local governments' needs. We will also consider the case of no accommodation in which the central government moves before local governments.
We define an equilibrium of the above game as strategy profiles of state enterprises, local governments and the central government, such that none of the parties has incentives to deviate unilaterally.
Our analysis is considerably simplified because whether an enterprise has a soft or a hard budget constraint is determined by a simple comparison between the benefits of bailout (B ) and the opportunity cost of doing so. 
II. Fiscal Competition As a Commitment Device
This section demonstrates a main theme of our paper: Fiscal competition among local governments may serve as a commitment device to harden budget constraints of enterprises.
A. The "First-Best" Allocation
In the "first-best" allocation, all inefficient projects are terminated (S = 0), and infrastructure i FB investment (I ) and local public goods provision (z ) are chosen to maximize social welfare W = E W .
The first best optimum (I , z ) satisfies
B. Fiscal Centralization
In the benchmark case of fiscal centralization, the central government is entitled to all tax revenues, has full authority over its budget, and has control rights over public investment and subsidies. Here the threetier hierarchy degenerates into a two-tier one in which local governments play no role. Define (I , z ) as a underinvestment in infrastructure I < I and underprovision of local public goods z < z .
There is a soft budget constraint equilibrium because, once enterprises with type 2 projects have chosen e , the marginal benefit from bailing out an enterprise is greater than the marginal cost, measured by l the welfare loss from less infrastructure investment and local public goods. Notice that because E > E , hard H S budget constraints would yield more tax revenues and thus would allow a higher welfare level. Thus, the government would prefer a commitment to no bailout.
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Comparative statics on ", the proportion of type 1 projects, yield interesting results which provide a reason for the increased number of bailouts after the reforms of expanding enterprise autonomy in China and other transition economies. To see this, assume that the government monitors enterprises with probability p, thereby forcing enterprises with type 2 projects to choose e . Because monitored enterprises with type 2 h projects behave as if they had type 1 projects, the effective proportion of type 1 projects becomes "' = " + p(1 -"), which increases with p. Reforms for expanding enterprise autonomy reduce government monitoring and have the effect of reducing ". A decrease in " worsens the average quality of the projects and thus increases the number of bailouts under a soft budget constraint equilibrium.
C. Fiscal Decentralization
We now examine the effect of fiscal competition under the conditions of Proposition 1. With fiscal decentralization, each local government is entitled to all tax revenues generated in its region. Moreover, it has full authority over its own budget and has control over public investment and subsidies in its jurisdiction.
Because the number of projects n is large, each region seen in isolation is identical in structure to a centralized nation. Because local governments are assumed to have the same objective function as the central government, it is therefore not self-evident that fiscal decentralization should be superior in achieving harder budget constraints.
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The crucial element is that fiscal decentralization induces competition among jurisdictions under factor mobility. In addition to the game between government and enterprises, there is a game among local governments. In our model, local governments compete with each other by making infrastructure investment Since all regions are identical, we will look at symmetric Nash equilibria. Complementarity between infrastructure investment and foreign capital inflow gives the following standard result:
Lemma 1: If f (K, I) < 0 and f (K, I) > 0, then dK /dI > 0 and dK /dI < 0 for all j … i.
Because of the fiscal competition, the first order condition for local government i becomes:
Define I and z as a solution to (5) above and (6) fiscal decentralization come at the cost of an allocative distortion: I > I and z < z .
The intuition is as follows. Competition among local governments in our model generates externalities under intranational capital mobility: It increases the marginal regional value of infrastructure investment above its marginal social value. This creates an allocative distortion with too much infrastructure investment and too few local public goods for a given budget. This distortion increases the marginal utility from local public goods provision and thus increases the opportunity cost of subsidizing type 2 projects in the state sector. When this cost outweighs the benefit of bailout (B ), terminating type 2 projects becomes s credible. To the extent that under-provision of local public goods is a general feature of fiscal competition, our results about fiscal competition hardening budget constraints should be robust.
The above results depend crucially on the difference between international and intranational mobility of capital. Without this difference, there would be no difference between centralization and decentralization because the central and local governments would compete in the same way for capital from the rest of the world. On the other hand, our results do not depend on the assumption that foreign capital is not taxed. We show in Appendix A that the results continue to hold for any given tax rate on foreign capital (or domestic non-state capital). Indeed, taxation of foreign capital will reinforce the government's incentive to increase infrastructure investment because an increase in foreign capital not only increases the employment benefits in the non-state sector but also increases tax revenue.
Hard budget constraints under decentralization yield more tax revenues but the cost of obtaining commitment is an under-provision of public goods, not only compared to the first-best solution but even compared to fiscal centralization. Figure 2 shows a possible welfare comparison (in terms of the total utility derived from infrastructure investment and local public goods, excluding the private benefits of the employees in state enterprises) among the first-best optimum, the soft budget constraint equilibrium under fiscal centralization, and the hard budget constraint equilibrium under fiscal decentralization. If the income effect from hard budget constraints dominates the distortionary effect in the choice of I and z , fiscal i i decentralization yields a higher total utility from infrastructure investment and local public goods compared to fiscal centralization.
[place Figure 2 here]
It is important to note the difference between commitment to hard budget constraints and commitment to decentralization. Interestingly, they differ for the same reason --irreversibility of earlier decisions. The lack of commitment to hard budget constraints is due to the irreversibility of effort decisions of enterprises at date 0, which gives rise to a bailout possibility at date 1. In contrast, because of the irreversibility of expenditure decisions of local governments, commitment to fiscal decentralization is selfenforced. Indeed, after observing the allocative choices of local governments at date 1, the central government would find it impossible to bail out enterprises since revenues would have already been spent.
But the central government would have no incentives for recentralization before date 1 if the total welfare is higher under fiscal decentralization. Recentralization is then either ineffective ex post, or undesirable ex ante.
D. Partial Fiscal Decentralization and Competition for Grants
In federal states, the central and local governments generally share fiscal revenues. One motivation for fiscal transfers between the central and local governments is to "correct" distortions created by fiscal competition between regions. In our model, this could happen through earmarked grants for local public goods and/or subsidies. However, such "corrections" may have adverse consequences for incentives. One The mechanisms underlying competition for grants and for foreign capital are in fact the same: By distorting more in the direction of higher I , a local government can obtain more grants from the central i government, given the choice of other regions. In any symmetric Nash equilibrium with S = 0, we will have i G z = G for all i. Let (I , z ) satisfy
with a strict inequality holding under z = 0. 
III. Fiscal Decentralization and Monetary Finance
In reality, the central government also has access to monetary sources of revenue. By incorporating the possibility of monetary financing by the central government, we can analyze the relationship between fiscal and monetary arrangements under federalism on the one hand, and soft budget constraints and inflation on the other. Two effects will occur: (1) monetary finance will increase budgets and thus tend to soften budget constraints; and (2) monetary finance may induce more distortions towards infrastructure investment due to competition for monetary grants. To obtain a hard budget constraints equilibrium, the latter effect must dominate the former.
We assume that R is the level of real resources from inflationary taxation available for additional government expenditures. Because inflationary finance is distortionary, we assume that the total welfare loss is equal to the amount of resources withdrawn R plus a quadratic deadweight loss (a/2)R . Therefore the The possibility of monetary finance increases the government budget and thus reduces the opportunity cost of subsidies. Therefore, the budget constraint of enterprises can only be made softer, the softer the lower the marginal cost of inflation (1 + aR ). In the following discussions, we take as the case CC 18 where budget constraints under fiscal and monetary centralization are soft as the benchmark case.
C. Fiscal Decentralization and Monetary Centralization
We first consider a situation which we call "accommodation," where the central government intends to use monetary grants to "correct" the distortionary decisions of local governments. In such a game, the local governments first decide on their expenditures, then the central government chooses total monetary finance and allocates monetary grants to local governments earmarked for local public goods and subsidies.
Given the choices of I and z of local governments, the central government determines Because of fiscal competition, the central and local governments exhibit (endogenously) different spending preferences since the marginal regional value of infrastructure investment is higher than the marginal national value. Therefore the local governments will use an increased regional budget in a different way (more for infrastructure investment) from the one the central government prefers (more for local public goods). When the central government has no power to correct the distortion created by the local governments towards infrastructure investment, total expenditures on local public goods under fiscal decentralization and monetary centralization can only be lower than those under fiscal and monetary centralization. Therefore, budget constraints will be harder since the marginal utility of local public goods is higher. Furthermore, the conflict of interest between the central and local governments also reduces the marginal benefit from inflation for the central government, and thus the central government has fewer incentives for monetary creation, provided that fiscal competition induces significant responses from local governments (i.e., dI /dR is i DN sufficiently high).
Comparing the results of Propositions 5 and 6 with those of Proposition 4, we see that higher inflation is obtained under fiscal decentralization when the central government has the power to use monetary creation to correct distortions made by local governments. In contrast, when the local governments have full control over their expenditures and the central government has no discretion over the allocation of seigniorage revenues between regions, both lower inflation and hard budget constraints can be achieved. The system of 21 separation of powers underlying Proposition 6 is thus better structured to achieve both objectives.
D. Fiscal and Monetary Decentralization
Although the case of monetary decentralization in which the central government completely loses control over the money supply to local governments is extreme, it is empirically relevant in several occasions.
In the 1980s, some local governments in China (mainly provincial governments) managed to secure easy credit from local branches of the central bank, which amounts de facto to a decentralization of the money supply (Qian and Weingast, 1996) . Similarly, Brazil had a recent experience where the money supply policy was also de facto decentralized from the central bank to heavily indebted states, which controlled state-owned banks (Wildasin, 1997b) . Another striking example is the case of the Commonwealth of Independent States where, after the break-up of the Soviet Union, independent republics continued to print rubles that circulated in the former Soviet territory. Because of the externality of inflation, inflation is always higher. Concerning budget constraints, there are two offsetting effects: Fiscal competition tends to harden them while monetary expansion tends to soften them. The latter effect tends to dominate because the inflation externality reduces the marginal cost of inflation, leading to higher budgets with high I and z and thus with a lower opportunity cost of bailouts.
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IV. Interpreting the Reform Experience of China
The above analysis sheds light on China's reform experience and its unique features. It is well known that in Eastern Europe and Russia, privatization is the main focus of transition and it is also considered a major instrument in hardening the budget constraints of enterprises. Privatization is also largely driven by the central government. In contrast, one of the most distinct features of China's transition has been associated with devolution of authority from the central to local levels of government (Qian and Weingast, 1996) .
Decentralization in China started as early as 1980 and has continued as a fundamental component of reform since then. As a result, local governments in China at all levels have acquired authority as well as responsibility over their own local economies. To see the extent of decentralization in China, consider, for example, the relative importance of local government expenditures. In 1994, local government expenditure represented 60% of government expenditures in China, compared with 34% in industrialized countries and 22% in developing countries (World Bank, 1996) .
Decentralization induces fiscal competition among local governments. Indeed, local governments in China compete vigorously in investing in infrastructure and establishing development zones in order to attract foreign capital and domestic business into their regions. Harry Broadman and Xiaolun Sun (1997) show that the level of infrastructure development, along with the market size, the educational level of the labor force, and the geographical location, accounts for 80% of the variation in the stock of foreign direct investment across provinces.
Decentralization also entails devolution of the supervision power of state-owned enterprises from the central to local governments. During the 1980s, state-owned enterprises supervised by local governments accounted for about three-quarters of the total industrial output in the state sector. Using a data set of 769 23 state enterprises covering this period, David D. Li (1997) found that state enterprises with directors appointed by local governments were more likely to reduce workers' wage and bonuses in cases of poor performance than the enterprises with directors appointed by the central government, where "poor performance" is measured by an annual decrease in two alternative indicators: real net output and real total returns to the state (tax, profits, plus interests). These results indicate that local government supervision over state enterprises, as opposed to central government supervision, has an effect of hardening the enterprise's budget constraints.
In recent years between 1994 and 1997, local governments in China took the initiative to massively lay off excess workers from state-owned enterprises and even to privatize some enterprises under their supervision (Yuanzheng Cao, Yingyi Qian, and Barry Weingast, 1997) . Layoffs were mostly organized by the local governments at the city level. In 1996 alone, about 10 million workers were laid off (most of them were from state enterprises), and even more in 1997. Privatization, on the other hand, was most significant at the county level. By 1996, some pioneering counties, such as Yibin of Sichuan, Shunde of Guangdong, and Zhucheng of Shandong, had privatized almost all of the state-owned enterprises under local supervision; and by 1997, most counties in the country had progressed to privatize more than half of the state-owned enterprises under local supervision.
What is more interesting are the institutional changes behind (and, relatedly, the timing of) such local government-led restructuring and privatization. Before 1993, China's monetary institutions were problematic. On some occasions China experienced a de facto monetary decentralization when some local governments forced the central bank branches in their regions to extend credit and print money; and on other occasions the central bank made a monetary expansion hoping to correct distortions made by the local governments (Wang, 1991; Qian and Weingast, 1996) . Since 1993, China has centralized its monetary authority and the central bank has refused to accommodate monetary policy to the local governments'
behavior (World Bank, 1996) . As a result, a nationwide credit crunch was imposed and inflation has declined drastically, from over 20 percent in 1993 to about 2 percent in 1997.
The local government-led restructuring and privatization of state-owned enterprises in China is an important and interesting phenomenon. The existing theories on government-owned firms and privatization 24 (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1994) cannot account for it, because they do not address the issue of how the organization of government matters in providing government itself with incentives for reform. According to our analysis, the incentives of local governments for restructuring and privatization can be induced endogenously by decentralization and competition, reflecting harder budget constraints for local governments and enterprises. Furthermore, the effect of hardening budget constraints of state-owned enterprises supervised by local governments should be stronger under monetary centralization. Our analysis fits the fact that local governments' initiatives of restructuring and privatization took place at the time when fiscal decentralization was maintained together with monetary recentralization.
V. Conclusions
Until recently, the microeconomic literature on transition economies has focused largely on the privatization and liberalization of markets in isolation from the reform of the organization of government in these economies. In this paper, we focus on the relationship between the reform of the organization of government and the incentive of government, and its effect on enterprises. We analyzed specifically how fiscal and monetary arrangements under federalism limit the government's behavior and affect the degree of the soft budget constraints of enterprises. Therefore, reform of the organization of government such as fiscal decentralization is an important dimension of the transition process, and can have a profound impact on many other dimensions of the transition.
Although our model was tailored to the Chinese economy, the themes we analyzed can apply to more than China. The first general insight relates to the commitment effects of fiscal competition which tends to change the incentives of government and limit its behavior. The literature on fiscal federalism has shown how fiscal competition can inefficiently reduce government activity. Our paper has shown that in a second best world fiscal competition may serve as a commitment device to prevent inefficient government spending. When t > 0, as compared with the case of t = 0, the government wants to spend more on I and less on z in order to get more tax revenue for any given budget. Therefore, introducing taxation tends to harden the budget constraint. On the other hand, the income effect tends to increase z, thus softening budget constraints.
The net effect is not clear. But our main interest is to compare centralization with decentralization for the same t.
Under fiscal decentralization, perfect capital mobility implies that
(1-t)f (K , I ) = (1-t)f (K , I ),
which is the same as t = 0. Thus, foreign capital allocation (K (I , ..., I ), ..., K (I , ..., I )) for any given (I , Note that
which is greater than
We assume (A3) holds (this is satisfied for Cobb-Douglas function f = K I ).
Comparing (A1) and (A2), starting with the optimal solution under centralization, then under decentralization, the left hand side becomes bigger, and the right hand side becomes smaller. Therefore, adding taxation reinforces the fiscal competition effect because the local government has more incentives to increase infrastructure investment. Therefore, with taxation t, under condition (A3), our results on decentralization are strengthened. The intuition is that, under decentralization, more investment in infrastructure attracts more foreign capital, which not only increases employment rents but also increases tax revenues. This double benefit makes the local governments spend more of their budget on infrastructure and less on other local public goods, which thus raises the opportunity cost for bailout.
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The benefit of bailout is still B , and the opportunity cost of bailout is still u'(z ). Then if
budget constraints are hard under fiscal decentralization but soft under fiscal centralization.
To conclude, our result in comparing centralization and decentralization continues to hold, independent of the tax rate t.
Second, consider the interpretation of K as domestic non-state capital. The objective function government in region i becomes:
where t is the tax on non-state capital.
When t = 0, it is easy to see that our results go through, because in all the proofs we simply replace x(K , I ) by f(K , I ). For any general t>0, we show that our analysis still goes through. Under centralization,
s.t. I + z = E + tK f (K , I ).
The first order conditions become
Under decentralization, with the same tax rate t, the first order conditions for local governments are changed to
Comparing ( Proof of Proposition 3: When (7) holds with equality, comparing (5) and (7), dz /dI > 0 implies for the i i G same budget E = z + G = z + z < z . Hence, u'(z + z ) > u'(z ) > B by the condition of Proposition 2.
Then neither the central government nor local governments have incentives for bailout. When (7) holds with inequality, if z + z = G < z , then the left hand side of (7) is greater than u'(z + z ), which is greater than
u'(z ) and B . If z + z = G > z , we must have I < I , then the left hand side of (7) is greater than
which is in turn greater than B . In both cases, the local governments have no incentives for bailout. Under 2 In a recent paper, David Wildasin (1997a) studied the issue of hard vs. soft federal grants to local governments. He argues that, due to an externality of local public goods, large local jurisdictions are likely to face softer budget constraints than small jurisdictions. This is because the failure to bail out the former would have far more severe consequences for the economy as a whole, leading to a "too big to fail" effect.
3 Both the models of Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny (1994) and Ilya Segal (1993) on soft budget constraints are based on the difference in objectives between the government and the private sector. In the former, the government cares about employment and in the latter about the total social surplus.
4 By focusing on a two-period model we leave aside the role of reputation in sustaining hard budget constraints. As is known from the theory of repeated games, reputation is an effective mechanism only if there is a long enough time horizon and a low enough discount rate. In this paper, we prefer to focus on the role of institutions in hardening budget constraints. 6 The difference between z and I is that the choice of the latter exerts an externality on other regions while i i the former does not. Whether z is a form of public investment or consumption is irrelevant for our results. i 7 The "first best" is in reference to domestic welfare.
8 We assume that u'(z ) is greater than 1. This ensures that at the optimum J = 0, which simplifies our lower welfare level as compared to a soft budget constraint equilibrium. In such a case, the government prefers to tax away all verifiable revenues.
10 The fact that local governments do not receive grants from the central government (i.e., the budget constraints of local governments are hard) is not really relevant here. Indeed, under centralization, the fiscal budget of the central government is also hard but enterprises have soft budget constraints as shown in Proposition 1.
11 For this first order condition to make sense, we assume that the left-hand side, i.e., the marginal value of infrastructure investment to region i, is decreasing in I . One can verify that this will be the case if f(K , I )
takes the form of a Cobb-Douglas function.
12 The general case where the central government can also earmark grants for infrastructure investment is technically more complicated and does not yield additional economic insight in the current set-up, given that local governments already overspend in infrastructure investment.
13 Yijiang Wang (1991) demonstrates similar distortionary effects in a model with a Cobb-Douglas production function (with fixed investment and circulating capital as two inputs). (N-1)/a. In that case, there will be both very high inflation and a high marginal utility of local public goods. This is a case where the marginal value of infrastructure investment is very high and decreases slowly so that the local public goods provision is always very small for any budget size. 
